Compliance verification activity type: Field Inspection
Team:
Regulated company: Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC
Operating company: Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC
Province(s) / Territory(s):
Discipline(s):
Rationale and scope:
This activity outlines the Emergency Management actions taken with respect to the Trans Mountain incident at the Sumas Pump Station in Abbotsford, British Columbia, on 12 June 2020. As remediation is ongoing, this report only covers the Emergency Phase of the incident, which occurred from 12 June 2020 until 17 June 2020.
Compliance tool(s) used:
Facilities:
Facility Types
Life-cycle Phases
Regulatory requirements that apply to this activity:
Observation 1 - Sumas Station Release
Date & time of visit: 2020-06-22 09:00
Discipline: Emergency Management
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Observations:
Incident SummaryThe Trans Mountain Sumas station confirmed a release of crude oil on Saturday 13 June 2020. A spill volume estimate was not initially available but the size of the spill was later estimated to be between 150-190 cubic meters (m3). The product released, a light sweet crude, was on the ground of the pump station and entered a storm drain, causing product to migrate to an adjacent field on Trans Mountain property. No waterways were directly impacted by this event at the time of writing this report.Company Response - Immediate ActionsWhen the on-site alarms were triggered by the release, Trans Mountain’s internal Security and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system alerted Trans Mountain personnel to a potential issue. The station automatically shut down when sensors recorded sufficient levels of vapours from the spilled product to initiate shut down.Trans Mountain deployed response personnel to the incident site, who then confirmed the release. The initial responder noted the vapour’s Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) concerns and Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) levels at the site, and retreated from the incident site on foot to take further response actions. Upon confirmation of the incident, Trans Mountain made the required notifications to regulators and potentially impacted communities and began deploying response resources to the incident site. The LEL levels triggered a public safety alert “shelter in place notification” to one local resident who was closest to the site. The shelter in place notice lasted until vapor levels returned to a safe concentration several hours later.Trans Mountain initially set up an Incident Command Post (ICP) at the Westridge Terminal on Shellmont Street in Burnaby. ICP staff established an Incident Command Structure with the necessary initial command and general staff positions. As per the Emergency Response Plan, Trans Mountain assigned company staff to the following positions: Incident Command (IC), Planning Section Chief (PSC), Operations Section Chief (OSC), Logistics (Log), Finance (Fin), Safety Offficer (SO) Information Officer (IO) and Liasion Officer (LNO).Early efforts and priorities in the field focussed on public safety and determining the extent of the release. Public safety measures included air monitoring and a shelter in place notice. Field responders established a field command post with Operations staff reporting back to the ICP, primarily via phone. The initial response actions were conducted per Trans Mountain’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP). Trans Mountain’s ERP and Sumas District Geographic Response Plan (GRP) are posted on Trans Mountain’s website as per the CER’s Order AO-001-MO-006-2016 - Compelling Publication of Emergency Procedures Manuals online.Air monitoring continued through the night with personal monitors. LEL and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) levels started to stabilize in the early hours of the morning and field staff were able to determine the extent of the spill by walking the perimeter fence. Vac trucks and Hydro-vac trucks were used to remove standing oil and impacted soil. Mobile community air monitoring was established in areas downwind from the incident. Canada Energy Regulator (CER) Notification and Field DeploymentTrans Mountain discovered the incident at approximately 00:16PDT on 13 June 2020. As per the CER’s event reporting guidelines, Trans Mountain notified the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) at approximately 01:57 PDT and the TSB subsequently notified the CER. Receipt of this notification triggered the CER’s internal incident triage process and the decision was made to deploy a CER Emergency Management Officer to site.A CER Emergency Management Officer prepared for mobilization at 08:30PDT on Saturday and then deployed to incident site at 10:30PDT. CER staff followed the CER Field Deployment Operational Guide, which included a health self-assessment and criteria for self-quarantine if symptoms of COVID-19 presented either during or after the deployment. Staff deployed with standard Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (fire retardant coveralls, steel toe boots, hard hat, gloves, eye protection, and hearing protection) as well as communicable disease prevention kits (hand sanitizer, N-95 face masks, Lysol wipes). The CER Emergency Management Officer arrived at the company Incident Command Post (ICP) in Burnaby at approximately 14:30PDT.A CER Inspection Officer was deployed from Calgary to conduct an environmental field inspection with Indigenous Advisory Monitoring Committee (IAMC) Indigenous Monitors (IM). This inspection was completed on 16 June 2020. The findings of that inspection, including the IM’s observations, are separate from this report and can be viewed on the CER’s website - CV2021-454. As of the date of this report, remediation efforts are still ongoing to remove the remaining impacted soil and ensure product has not migrated off site or impacted ground water. The incident is being overseen by the CER’s Environmental Protection team.Incident Chronology13 June 2020: The CER Emergency Management Officer arrived at the Burnaby ICP at 14:30PDT. Staff signed in to the ICP and filled out COVID-19 declarations stating they were asymptomatic. COVID-19 precautions were in place at the ICP including personal distancing, access to hand sanitizer and masks. These COVID-19 precautions were followed every day in the field and at the ICP. The CER Emergency Management Officer was given a briefing on the current situation. The pipeline was shut down, no longer releasing product, air monitoring was ongoing and product was being removed from the site. The incident was classified as a Level 2, as per Trans Mountain’s Emergency Response Plan. A hot zone was established, marking the point of impact and area immediately adjacent to it. Next to the hot zone was the ‘warm zone’ where responders enter and exited the hot zone, and where decontamination was established. Outside the warm zone was considered the cold zone; the area of the site which was free from contamination and used as a planning and staging area.The CER Emergency Management Officer and the Trans Mountain Incident Commander established Unified Command and held an Objectives meeting, followed by the Command and General Staff meeting. The Unified Command created the following objectives for the Operational Period (OP):
Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used
Identified non-compliances to company plans or procedures are non-compliances either to:
- the condition of an authorization document that requires the implementation of that plan or procedure; or
- the relevant section of the regulations that requires implementation of that plan or procedure including those sections that require implementation of plans or procedures as a part of a Program